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Reporter's Note: This opinion, or a reasonable facsimile
thereof, is expected to appear in a forthcoming issue of the
Federal Supplement.
Frothingim V. Mellon, DistrictJudge:
I am asked in this case to decide whether i federal taxpayer's suit, challenging the constitutionality of an expenditure by the United States,
may be maintained by a plaintiff Who alleges that he is not now and
never has been a taxpayer. Having attained this enviable status as a
lifelong recipient of tax-exempt welfare payments, he states that he
finds the prospect of receiving taxable income so unappealing that he
intends to eschew any such opportunities; in keeping with this prediction, his complaint candidly admits that he is unlikely to pay any federal taxes in the future. In characterizing himself as a non-taxpayer,
he would seem to invite a summary dismissal of his suit, were it not
for the development in recent years of the concept of the fictitious-or,
as some have termed it, the spurious-taxpayer's suit. Before discussing
the application of this legal doctrine to the plaintiff before me, however, I think it well to review briefly the history of the federal taxpayer's suit since Flastv. Cohen.'
In the Flast case, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute
authorizing expenditures that allegedly violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment could be attacked by plaintiffs whose
standing to sue rested solely on the fact that they paid federal income
taxes:
t Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Professor Bittker informs the Editors
that the "immediate stimulus" for this article was "Standing: Taxpayers and Others" by
Kenneth Culp Davis in Volume 35 of the Review. Professor Davis's response appears at
page 375 of this issue.
1 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500
(1965); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968); Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
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[W]e hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with
Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges
that congressional action under the taxing and spending
clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power. The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be
that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of
legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial
redress, and the taxpayer has established the necessary nexus
between his status and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure ju2
dicial review.
In the two decades since this "cornerstone of the law of standing '3
was laid down, the courts have erected upon it an imposing, if not always harmonious or universally-acclaimed, structure. Although predictions are perilous, the case before me may turn out to be the capstone
of this architectural endeavor.
It will be recalled that the first plaintiff to bring a suit after the
decision in the Flast case was a French businessman who was a passenger on a plane that, while en route from Paris to Montreal, was forced
by engine trouble to land at Kennedy International Airport. Having
spent the night in New York City, where he made several long distance
telephone calls that were subject to federal excise tax, he sued the
United States to restrain the expenditure of federal funds to maintain
military bases located in Louisiana, alleging (in the language of the
Flast case) that "his tax money" was being spent improperly because
the Louisiana Purchase was an unconstitutionally ultra vires expansion
of United States sovereignty. Without reaching the merits, the Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of his suit on the ground that an
"accidental" taxpayer does not have a sufficient interest in the constitutionality of federal expenditures to justify a judicial resolution of his
contention. This limitation on the taxpayer's suit became known as the
"accidental taxpayer" exception.
As might perhaps have been foreseen in view of our strained relations with de Gaulle, a similar suit was filed within a few months by
a second French businessman, who sought to take himself out of the
"accidental taxpayer" category by alleging that he passed through
Kennedy International Airport at least once a month on his way
2 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
3 "The narrow holding [of Flast v. Cohen] seems impregnable and seems destined to
become a long-term cornerstone of the law of standirig." Davis, supra note 1, at 601.
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from Paris to Winnipeg and that he always bought a federally-taxed
cocktail while waiting for his connecting plane. He buttressed these
allegations with the charge that the inefficiency of a federal agency
responsible for the operation of the airport caused frequent delays,
so that he often bought more than one drink while, as he put it, "held
in captivity" in New York City. This suit was dismissed on a broader
theory than had been advanced against its predecessor, viz., that an
alien who has not "entered" the United States by passing through the
Customs and Immigration barrier at an international airport cannot
be a "taxpayer." Citing numerous authorities, the Court said that a
"tax" is a charge imposed by a government on persons enjoying the
benefit of its protection, a status that is not attained by aliens before
they have entered the country. Although the amount paid by the
plaintiff was called a "tax," the Court said that "in truth and in reality it was a fee paid for assurance that the drink was not adulterated
or mislabelled." Acknowledging that it is not always easy to determine
whether a government-imposed liability is a "tax" or a "fee," the
Court said that the consequences of permitting nonresident aliens to
flood the courts with politically-inspired suits warranted an irrebuttable presumption that payments by nonresident aliens in such circumstances are "fees" rather than "taxes." This restriction on the
federal taxpayer's suit became known as the "non-tax tax" doctrine.
Gallic persistence did not run out with this decision. The Court
was soon confronted by a taxpayer's suit brought by a French corporation which, being engaged in business in the United States through
a "permanent establishment," was required to pay federal income tax
on its domestic business profits. The Supreme Court held that a legal
entity owing its existence to the law of another sovereignty could not
maintain a federal taxpayer's suit; such a suit presupposed, the Court
held, a "single-minded" interest in enforcing the Constitution of the
United States, an interest that could not be reconciled with a foreign
entity's obligations to another sovereign. This development (the socalled "loyal taxpayer" doctrine) made it clear that the payment of
taxes was, by itself, insufficient to qualify a plaintiff to maintain a
federal taxpayer's suit; and it led some commentators to argue that the
law of standing needed a better cornerstone.
While this academic dispute was being pursued in the law journals,
however, the courts continued to explicate the "loyal taxpayer" doctrine, and in an important case it was applied to disqualify a United
States corporation all of whose shareholders were aliens. This restriction, in turn, was elaborated by the courts to bar suits by United States
corporations that, despite formal American ownership, were "con-

1969]

Federal Taxpayer's Suit

trolled," directly or indirectly, by aliens. After a few years of experience with ad hoc judicial determinations of the existence vel non of
proscribed foreign "control," Congress established an administrative
agency-the Taxpayer's Suit Licensing Board-charged with the obligation of determining whether a corporation which wished to bring
a taxpayer's suit against the United States was foreign-controlled.
This Board's zeal, which included the employment of Swiss informers
to gain evidence of the complicity of Swiss banks in concealing foreign
interests in United States corporations, was much resented by foreign
governments; and this led the State Department in a notable case to
"suggest" to the district court that it would be well to deny to all
corporations the right to act as plaintiffs in federal taxpayer's suits,
rather than continue the practice of judicial or administrative discrimination against foreign-controlled corporations. The "suggestion"
was indignantly rejected as an attempted invasion of a purely judicial
sphere; but the court reached the same result on the ground that it
was "wholly anomalous" to permit corporations to act as plaintiffs in
taxpayer's actions. The theory of the court was that corporate charters
are granted by state legislatures to enable business groups to pursue
business objectives; because "the business of a corporation is business
and not politics," the court held that it had no standing to maintain a federal taxpayer's suit which, though based on a "pocketbook
injury," never results in a money judgment to the injured party.
Although some commentators thought that this prohibition on corporate suits presaged the death of the "pocketbook injury" rationale
as to all plaintiffs, arguing that it should be replaced by a "citizen
interest" concept of standing, 4 persistent judicial assertions that a financial loss was the basis of standing in federal taxpayers' suits led the
government to seek an advantage in this orthodoxy, rather than its
repudiation. Thus, in an important case, the Treasury counterclaimed
against the plaintiff, alleging that he had underpaid his federal income
taxes for the year in which he claimed taxpayer status and asking the
court to decide this issue along with the taxpayer's constitutional
claim. The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that a decision on
the government's counterclaim would undermine the procedures decreed by Congress for assessing, determining, and collecting tax deficiencies; and it was held, accordingly, that a tax delinquency could not
be used affirmatively, as a "sword," in a taxpayer's suit. In a later suit,
the government sought to use an alleged tax delinquency defensively, as
4 Cf. Jaffe's concept of "public action," L. JAFFE, supra note 1; and note that as early
as 1960, it was asserted that taxpayers' suits have "functionally" become "citizens' suits."
69 YALE L.J. at 906.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:364

a 'shield," to bar the plaintiff from pursuing his taxpayer's suit until
his tax liability was finally determined in the appropriate fashion. Even
though the government was not asking for a money judgment by way of
counterclaim in the taxpayer's suit, the Court rejected its assertion. In
a similar vein, the courts refused to strike a financial balance even
when the government offered to prove that the plaintiff was indebted to
it for back taxes or other undisputed claims in an amount greater than
the "dollars-and-cents" injury alleged by him in his taxpayer's suit.
Other decisions undermining the "pocketbook injury" theory of
the taxpayer's suit can also be found by a diligent student of the reported cases. For example, in a case in which the government offered
to refund a pro rata share of the offensive expenditure to the plaintiff,
thus making him whole again, it was held that he could refuse the offer
and press the case if he so desired. (The proposal was evidently made
at a time when the statute of limitations would have prevented the
institution of a new suit by another plaintiff.) Though not a class action, the suit wa imbued with a public interest that would be frustrated, said the Court, if the government were allowed to "buy off"
the plaintiff. From this holding, it was, of course, only a step to a
determination that the action was a quasi-class suit, which could not
be terminated by the plaintiff alone; since other potential plaintiffs
might have refrained from suing in reliance on his initiative, they are
entitled to be nptifed and to take over the suit, should the original
plaintiff grow weary, at least if the statute of limitations would bar an
independent action by them. In a case that was much debated in the
law schools, this principle was applied to permit a suit to be transferred from an alien (disqualified by the "loyal taxpayer" doctrine) to
a citizen, although the substituted plaintiff had himself been an alien
when the case was begun. A taxpayer's suit is a public trust, said the
Court ini a much-quoted aphorism; to allow the trust res to evaporate
for want of a qualified plaintiff is equivalent to allowing the government to take private property without just compensation. "While this
Court sits," it was said, "we will not allow the government to work a
forfeiture of a cause of action that arose through its own violation of
the Constitution. Felonies may not be compoundedl" This arresting
language has been often repeated at bar association dinners.
In another series of cases, the courts were called upon to determine
the ambit of the term "taxpayer," as used in the shorthand phrase
"taxpayer's suit." In the first case in this series, the court held that a
plaintiff who had paid federal income taxes for past years qualified as
a "taxpayer" even thqugh his income in the year the suit was commenced was below the exemption level. On the assumption-not chal-
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lenged by the government-that the federal income tax is a permanent
institution, the court held that the plaintiff's "career" as a taxpayer
had been interrupted, rather than terminated, by the low level of
income received by him in the year of the suit. Although this "dormant
taxpayer" doctrine seemed to conflict with the requirement that the
plaintiff suffer a "pocketbook injury," the courts pointed out that
money is fungible, and from this fact it was asserted that the offensive
expenditures might have been financed with the "tax money" contributed by the plaintiff in past years. Commentators objected to this
theory, arguing that the Treasury was running deficits throughout
the years in question, so that no "tax money" taken from the plaintiff
in one year could have been used to finance expenditures in later
years. Before this objection was presented to the courts for decision,
however, the "dormant taxpayer" doctrine fell into desuetude or,
more precisely, was merged into the broader "incipient taxpayer"
doctrine.
The "incipient taxpayer" doctrine emerged from a group of cases
in which the plaintiffs alleged that by virtue of youth, early losses in
establishing a business, or other circumstances, they had not yet paid
any federal taxes, but that they could reasonably be expected to become taxpayers at a later time. After initial fumbling, the courts held
that such an allegation (if not disproved by the government) was sufficient to establish a "dollars-and-cents" injury: the plaintiff will have
to carry some of the burden of present expenditures, through the increased government debt (or failure to reduce the debt) resulting
from these expenditures, and also because expenditure programs-once
instituted-have a momentum that encourages if it does not insure
their continuation. (To be sure, the Supreme Court had said in the
Frothingharacases that the effect of current federal expenditures on
future taxation was too "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" to create
standing to sue, but that was before the Flast case.) The Court acknowledged that it was paradoxical to describe a non-taxpayer as a
taxpayer, but said that the concept of a quasi-this or an incipient-that
was not unknown to the law. It also asserted that labels should not be
controlling, pointing out that a successful taxpayer's suit will in any
event be of benefit only to future taxpayers (by lowering the level,
possibly, of future taxes), since it never results in a refund of past taxes.
As already suggested, the "incipient taxpayer" doctrine swallowed up
the "dormant taxpayer" doctrine: if a suit can be maintained by one
who has not yet helped to finance his government's operations, it can
5 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
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a fortiori be maintained by an incipient taxpayer who has also made
payments in past years. Indeed, some scholars suggested that the plaintiff should always be required to prove that he expects to pay taxes in
the future, and that an allegation of past tax payments should be
stricken as irrelevant.
The next step in expanding the concept of "taxpayer" was taken
in a case whose plaintiff derived all of his income from tax-exempt
state and municipal bonds, and who baldly asserted that he did not
intend to alter this practice in the future. His claim to taxpayer-status
was based on the "incipient taxpayer" doctrine, since he asserted that
if the expenditures that he challenged on constitutional grounds were
allowed to continue, Congress might well decide to expand the tax
base by requiring state and municipal bond interest to be included in
taxable income. Accepting this line of argument, the Court held that
he was a "potential" incipient taxpayer, whose pocketbook was threatened in a more-than-speculative fashion by the expenditures he desired to attack. It was noted that no one can be sure that he will pay
taxes in the future, even if his financial profile fits within today's tax
law; since the currently exempt plaintiff has no vested interest in his
immunity, the offensive expenditure, if not terminated, may kill his
golden goose.
In deciding for the plaintiff on this ground (the "golden goose," or
"last straw," doctrine), the Court was able to avoid ruling directly on
a second line of argument advanced on his behalf, viz., that he was "in
effect" a taxpayer since, to obtain tax immunity, he had accepted a
lower rate of return on his investments than he would have realized on
taxable investments. There should be no distinction, he argued, between a person who takes in $100,000 in taxable interest and pays out
$40,000 in federal taxes, and a person who takes in $60,000 net of
taxes because he invests solely in tax-exempt securities. After pointing
out that this ground was unnecessary in view of the plaintiff's status as
a "potential incipient taxpayer," the court went on to say that he had
failed to prove that his net income had in fact been diminished by
his exemption; and this dictum left a residue that we must contend
with now, since it implied that a person who bears the burden of taxation is a taxpayer even though he pays nothing directly to the government.
This implication, which has been dubbed "the indirect taxpayer
doctrine," soon became grist for the judicial mill. A plaintiff alleged
that he bore the burden of federal taxation because the cost of goods
and services purchased by him reflected, at least in part, the taxes imposed on the purveyors with whom he dealt. Admitting that expert
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opinion is not in harmony on the extent of tax-shifting, he argued
that some shifting of the burden was likely; and he asked therefore to
be allowed to maintain a taxpayer's suit on the ground that unconstitutional federal expenditures damaged his material well-being in a
real sense, even though the burden might have been diluted because
shifting is not complete. His claim, in short, was that "standing" should
be viewed as "running with" the tax burden. The government responded that the extent of shifting was indeed uncertain, and-of
greater import-that the plaintiff might himself be passing the burden
on to his customers. But the latter point could be offered against any
taxpayer, and if accepted would prevent anyone from qualifying as a
plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit. The Supreme Court concluded, therefore,
that a person bearing the burden of taxation could institute a taxpayer's suit, and it coupled this conclusion with a presumption that
any purchaser of goods and services in the domestic economy bears,
albeit indirectly, the burden of taxation unless the contrary is shown
by the clear preponderance of the evidence.0
This decision-widely hailed as a triumph of realism over conceptualism-was thought to mean that everyone in our society could
qualify as a plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit; and this result was approved
by many commentators because it permitted the taxpayer's suit to remain as a "cornerstone of the law of standing,"7 while purging it of the
invidious implication, as offensive as a property qualification for voting, that only the rich are entitled to complain about government
expenditures.
The case before me, however, reminds us that there are persons in
America who cannot qualify as dormant taxpayers, incipient taxpayers,
potential incipient taxpayers, or indirect taxpayers. This plaintiff cannot bring himself within any of these categories because the relief pay-

6 In thus equating the economic burden of a tax with its legal incidence, the Court
may have overlooked First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Commission, 392 US.
339, 346 (1968), where it noted that the lower court had held that a sales tax imposed
on a vendor of personal property cannot be regarded as a "tax" on the vendee, even if
the vendor "decides to pass the burden of the tax on to [the vendee) through an increased price." This holding was not controlling, however, since the Court found, in the
end, that the "legal incidence," not merely the economic burden, of the tax in question
was on the vendee, a national bank. Moreover, one must not overlook the painful dilemma
in which the Court found itself in that case: although the burden of taxation falls at
least in part on many persons with whom the technical taxpayer has business dealings,
the Court obviously could not have stricken down all taxes to the extent that, sooner
or later, they might be borne by a national bank. It was forced, therefore, either to
apply McCulloch v. Maryland to discriminatory taxes only, or to cling to a conceptual
distinction between the "legal incidence" of a tax and its economic consequences-unless
it was prepared to join the dissenters in re-examining the character of national banks.
7 Supra note 3.
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ments by which he has been, is, and expects to be supported are nontaxable and are geared to the cost of living; thus, he does not feel the
burden of taxation since his benefits escalate in exact measure to
increases in the cost of living. Moreover, the escalation clause has
been held to constitute a "vested right" of which the plaintiff cannot
be deprived without just compensation, and it embraces not only the
level of payments but also their immunity from taxation. If anyone is
barred from acting as a plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit, therefore, it is
the person before me.
In support of his request to be recognized as a legitimate claimant in
a federal taxpayer's suit, however, the plaintiff argues that he will
suffer i "pocketbook injury" if the allegedly improper expenditures are
not terminated, because-he alleges--Congress will be less willing to
increase the level of his welfare benefits; cotversely, he asserts, a rediiction of the expenditures in question will make it that much easier
for his congressional champions to wage a successful campaign on his
behalf. There is, he candidly admits, no assurance that Congress will
in fact ekpand the w.elfar pr6gram if it is compelled to reduce the level
of expenses elsewheie, but he points out that the orthodox taxpayer's
suit is equally speculative in its impact: damages are never awarded to
the plaintiff, and it is possible that Congress will spend "his tax money"
in other, Unaisailable programs if the orie he attacks is held to be
unconstitutional.
The plaintiff also makes the interesting point that if tax allbwances
(e.g., percentage depletion and the exemption of state and municipal
bond interest) are iropeily regarded as the equivalent of expenditures
by the federal government (a theory that is accepted by many respected
authorties),8 the converse is also true, viz., a federal refusal to make
an expenditure for a group of citizens is tantamount to taxing them.
This leads him to assert that a congressional refusal or failure to increase welfare payments should be viewed by this court as the functional
equivalent of a tax on him and others similarly situated, and that they
should therefore be regarded as taxpayers.
Pursuing further his argument that unconstitutional expenditures
should be presumed to affect him adversely, the plaintiff asks that
jurisdiction in his case be patterned on the familiar common law
writ of quo minus, the device by which the jurisdiction of the English
8 See, e.g., 113 CONG. RiEc. 36,404 (1967) (remarks of Congressman Mills). The impact of
the theory that tax exemptions are functionally equivalent to expenditures has been seen

in several federal taxpayer's suits in which taxpayers have attacked the statutory allowances enjoyed by other taxpayers, asserting that these allowances should be treated as
expenditures. Because these cases are still pending, I comment no further on the issue.
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Court of Exchequer was expanded to embrace private lawsuits, on the
theory that if the injured party's loss was not redressed, his ability to
pay his feudal dues or other debts to the Crown would be impaired.9
In time, the allegations that the plaintiff requesting Exchequer jurisdiction owed something to the Crown, and would be unable to pay it,
could not be traversed by the defendant.
The analogy is so apt, and my desire to be governed by precedent
so great, that I would be tempted to decide the case in the plaintiff's
favor on this ground, were it not for a second line of argument advanced by him, which I find even more persuasive. This claim is that
poverty, and poverty alone, is the reason why he is not a taxpayer of any
species (ordinary, dormant, incipient, potential incipient, or indirect);
if he were a property owner, he would either pay taxes on his income
or bear the burden of taxation on purchasing the goods and services
needed to maintain his assets. Surely the due process clause forbids
such an invidious distinction-totally unrelated to the plaintiff's per10
sonal merits-as this.
What we must ask of a plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is that his credentials give us confidence:
that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity,
that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary
vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made
in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial
resolution."
Once we recognize that an ordinary plaintiff in a federal taxpayer's
suit has no greater financial interest in his complaint than the hope
that his future tax liability be lower by some small amount if the objectionable expenditures are prohibited, it becomes clear that the interest of the plaintiff before me in effective and vigorous advocacy is no
less substantial. I hold, therefore, that he is entitled to institute a taxpayer's suit.
It has been urged that to take this final step would be to convert
the federal taxpayer's suit into the "public action" advocated some
decades ago by Professor Jaffe . 2 I am, of course, aware of the important
differences between the taxpayer's suit, based as it is on a "pocketbook
injury" to the plaintiff, and the so-called public action, which would
9 Wurzel, The Origin and Development of Quo Minus, 49 YALE L.J. 39 (1939).
10 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
11 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
12 L. JAFFE, supra note 1.
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permit any self-appointed protector of the community to clutter up
the courts with lawsuits. But my decision, quite obviously, will do no
more than permit federal taxpayer's suits to be brought by those who
are qualified to bring them. A plaintiff will have to allege that he has
paid, is paying, or will pay federal taxes; or that he bears the burden of
federal taxation; or that it would be a denial of due process to prevent
him from instituting a taxpayer's suit. My decision, therefore, does no
injury to the "cornerstone of the law of standing," but merely unveils
its true contours. If they turn out to be co-extensive with Professor
Jaffe's "public action," so be it. It will not be the first time that a legal
doctrine, on full examination, was found to coalesce with an apparently conflicting legal principle.
The motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

